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3.1  Introduction 
Do not-for-profit hospitals provide better care than for-profit hospitals? 
While many studies have compared care delivered by  for-profit and not- 
for-profit hospitals, these studies have provided relatively little empirical 
evidence on the performance of not-for-profits and for-profits.' The ulti- 
mate measure of hospital performance is the impact of its care on impor- 
tant patient outcomes, such as death or the development of serious com- 
plications that compromise quality of life. Assessing this impact is very 
difficult. First, collecting reliable long-term outcome data can be challeng- 
ing. Second, without comprehensive controls for differences in patient 
case mix, such measures leave open the possibility that differences be- 
tween hospitals reflect differences in patient disease severity and comor- 
bidity rather than differences in quality of care. Finally, measures of im- 
portant patient outcomes are notoriously noisy, due to the small numbers 
of patients on which they are based and the relative rarity of serious ad- 
verse outcomes for most patients. Thus, many policymakers and health 
care managers have expressed reservations about whether measures of se- 
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rious outcomes are informative enough to identify useful differences in 
quality of  care among hospitals.2 The problem is  particularly  onerous 
for comparisons of quality of care between individual hospitals (e.g., for 
choosing among hospitals in a given market area). 
We readdress the question of assessing hospital quality using longitudi- 
nal data sources and methods that we  have recently developed (McClellan 
and Staiger 1997). We discuss the data and methods below. We  study im- 
portant health  outcomes-all-cause  mortality  and major cardiac com- 
plications-for  all elderly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized with heart 
disease in the past decade. Our measures optimally combine information 
on patient outcomes from multiple years, multiple diagnoses, and multiple 
outcomes (e.g., death and readmission with various types of  complica- 
tions). As  a result, we  are able to develop measures that  are far more 
accurate indicators of hospital quality than those previously used in hospi- 
tal outcome studies. In our previous work, we  have shown that these mea- 
sures far outperform previously used methods in terms of forecasting hos- 
pital mortality rates in future years, and in terms of signal-to-noise ratios. 
Thus, we  can expect these measures to enhance our ability to determine 
whether quality of care differs across hospitals. 
After we introduce our data and methods, we present two sets of results. 
First, we  examine how these new  hospital quality measures vary across 
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, controlling for other characteris- 
tics of the hospital. In addition, we examine how these relationships have 
changed over our study period. We  then examine the experience of three 
market areas closely: (1) a city in which a few large for-profit and not-for- 
profit hospitals have coexisted with stable ownership, (2) a city in which a 
large not-for-profit hospital was purchased by  a for-profit chain, and later 
by  another for-profit chain, and  (3) a city in which the only for-profit 
hospital was converted to not-for-profit status. 
Based on these new measures of hospital quality, our analysis uncovers 
a number of interesting differences between for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals. On average, we find that for-profit hospitals have higher mortal- 
ity among elderly patients with heart disease, and that this difference has 
grown over the last decade. However, much of the difference appears to 
be associated with the location of for-profit hospitals: When we  compare 
hospital quality within specific markets, for-profit ownership appears, if 
anything, to be associated with better quality care. Moreover, the small 
average difference in mortality between for-profit and not-for-profit hospi- 
tals masks an enormous amount of variation in mortality within each of 
these ownership types. Overall, these results suggest that factors other 
2.  E.g., see Ash  (1996), Hofer and Hayward (1996), Luft and Romano (1993), McNeil 
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than for-profit status per se may be the main determinants of quality of 
care in hospitals. 
3.2  Background 
Comparisons of hospital quality, and of provider quality more generally 
in health care and other industries, must address three crucial problems: 
measurement, noise, and bias. 
The first problem involves measurement. Without measures of perfor- 
mance, there is no basis for comparing quality of care. One of the major 
obstacles to research on provider performance is the development of reli- 
able data on important medical processes and health outcomes. For ex- 
ample, a major obstacle to comparisons of different managed care plans 
today, including for-profit and not-for-profit comparisons, is  that many 
plans simply do not have reliable mechanisms in place for collecting data 
on the care and outcomes of their patients, especially for outpatient care. 
While the problem is somewhat less severe for care during an inpatient 
admission, many hospitals do not  have reliable methods for collecting 
follow-up data on their patients, and health plans do not have mechanisms 
for tracking patients across hospitals. For example, until several years ago, 
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) published diagnosis- 
specific mortality rates for Medicare patients. But because these outcome 
measures were admission based, they could be favorably affected by hospi- 
tal decisions about discharging or transferring patients, even though such 
actions may have no effect or adverse effects on meaningful patient out- 
comes. We  use  longitudinal data from the Medicare program linked to 
complete records  of  death dates  to address the  problem of  collecting 
follow-up data on important outcomes for patients. But data limitations 
exist here as well: Medicare collects no reliable information on the care or 
outcomes of their rapidly growing managed care population. 
The second problem involves noise. Important health outcomes are de- 
termined by  an enormous number of patient and environmental factors; 
differences in the quality of medical care delivered by hospitals are only 
one component. Moreover, most of these outcomes are relatively rare. For 
example, even for a common serious health problem such as heart attacks, 
most hospitals treat fewer than 100 cases per year, and death within a year 
occurs in fewer than one-fourth of these patients. Even though a one or 
two percentage point difference in mortality may  be very  important to 
patients, few hospitals treat enough patients with heart disease in a year 
to detect such differences in outcomes. While data on other related health 
outcomes or on multiple years of outcomes might help reduce the noise 
problem, combining multiple outcome measures raises further complica- 
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extent to which different outcomes are related to each other may not be 
obvious. We  develop a general framework for integrating a potentially 
large number of  outcomes over long time periods to address the noise 
problem. Our methods are designed to distinguish the signal of hospital 
quality from a potentially large number of noisy outcome measures. 
The third problem involves bias. Patient selection may result in differ- 
ences in outcomes across hospitals for reasons unrelated to quality. In 
particular, higher quality hospitals are likely to attract more difficult cases. 
A range of methods, including multivariate case-mix adjustment, propen- 
sity scores, and instrumental variables, have been developed to address 
the selection problem. In this paper, we  address the problem by focusing 
on an illness-heart  attacks, and heart disease more generally-for  which 
urgency limits the opportunities for  selection across hospitals. A more 
comprehensive analysis of  the selection problem is beyond the scope of 
this paper. In section 3.6, we discuss some of the further evidence we  have 
developed on the magnitude of  the selection bias in our outcome mea- 
sures. 
In the next section, we outline our steps for addressing the measurement 
problems and noise problems that have complicated comparisons between 
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. Our results follow. 
3.3  Data and Methods 
3.3.1  Data 
We use the same data as in McClellan and Staiger (1997) for this analy- 
sis. Our hospital performance measures include serious outcomes-mor- 
tality and cardiac complications requiring rehospitalization-for  all el- 
derly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized with new  occurrences of  acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI, or heart attacks) from 1984 through  1994, 
as well as for all elderly beneficiaries hospitalized for ischemic heart dis- 
ease (IHD) from 1984 through 1991. To evaluate quality of care from the 
standpoint of  a person in the community experiencing heart disease, we 
assign each patient to the hospital to which he or she was first admitted 
with that diagnosis. Our population includes over 200,000 AM1 patients 
and over 350,000 IHD patients per year. We limit our analysis of hospital 
performance to U.S. general short-term hospitals with at least two admis- 
sions in each year, a total of 3,991 hospitals that collectively treated over 
92 percent of these patients. In this paper, we focus exclusively on outcome 
differences for AM1 patients, but we  use information on IHD patient out- 
comes to help improve our estimates of hospital quality for AM1 treatment. 
For each AM1 and IHD patient, our mortality measure is whether the 
patient died within 90 days of admission. In principle, we  could use other 
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for a cardiac complication). We  focus on these two outcomes, and AM1 
patients in particular, for a number of  reasons. First, death is an easily 
measured, relatively common adverse outcome for AMI, and many acute 
medical treatments have been shown to have a significant impact on mor- 
tality following AMI. Second, AM1 cases that are not immediately fatal 
generally result in rapid admission to a nearby hospital, so that questions 
of hospital selection of patients are less of a problem for AMI. Finally, we 
found in a previous study (McClellan and Staiger 1997) that measures of 
hospital quality based on AM1 have a relatively high signal-to-noise ratio 
and are strong predictors of hospital quality for other outcomes and diag- 
nose~.~ 
For each hospital, we construct risk-adjusted mortality rates (RAMRs) 
for each year and each diagnosis. These are the estimated hospital-specific 
intercepts from a patient-level regression (run separately by  year and by 
diagnosis) that estimates average all-cause mortality rates with fully inter- 
acted controls for age, gender, black or nonblack race, and rural location. 
These RAMRs provide the outcome measures on which our hospital com- 
parisons are based. 
To describe hospital ownership status and other characteristics, we  use 
data on hospital and area characteristics from the annual American Hos- 
pital Association (AHA) survey of hospitals. We  use data from the 1985, 
1991, and 1994 surveys in this analysis. AHA data are not available for 
some hospitals, limiting our final sample to 3,7 18 hospitals. 
3.3.2  Empirical Methods 
Past work comparing quality of care in hospitals has generally relied on 
a single hospital outcome measure in a given year. For example, to com- 
pare quality of care at two hospitals, one would simply calculate the esti- 
mated RAMR and the precision of the estimate for each hospital, and 
assess whether the difference in the RAMRs is statistically significant. The 
limitation of this approach is that the standard errors are often quite large. 
Alternatively, one can combine information from all the outcome mea- 
sures available for a given hospital (e.g., other years, other patients, other 
outcomes for the same patients) in order to more precisely estimate a hos- 
pital’s current quality. This is the approach taken in McClellan and Staiger 
(1997). We briefly outline the method below. 
Suppose we  observe AMI-DTH90  and IHD-DTH90.  These are noisy 
estimates of the true hospital intercepts that are of interest: 
AMI-DTH90i,  =  p:, +  ~f,, 
3. In particular, McClellan and Staiger (1997) also consider performance measures for 
ischemic heart disease and for a patient’s quality of life following a heart attack (the occur- 
rence of hospital readmission with congestive heart failure, ischemic heart disease symp- 
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IHD_DTH90,, =  p:,  +  E:,, 
where p is the true parameter of interest (the hospital-specific intercept in 
the 90-day mortality equations), E is the estimation error, and we  observe 
each outcome for Tyears. Note that Var(E:, ~f,)  can be estimated, since this 
is simply the variance of regression estimates. 
Let M, = {AMI_DTH90,, IHD-DTH9OZ}  be a 1  X(2T) vector of the T 
years of data on each outcome, and let p, = {p:, pf]  be a lX(2T) vector 
of the true hospital intercepts. Our problem is how to use M,  to predict IJ.,. 
More specifically, we wish to create a linear combination of each hospital’s 
observed outcomes data in such a way that it minimizes the mean square 
error of our predictions. In other words, we would like to run the following 
hypothetical regression: 
(1)  p,,  =  {AM1-DTH9OL, IHD-DTH9O8} p,, +  u,,  =  MLp,,  +  u,,, 
but cannot, since p, is unobserved and p will vary by hospital and time. 
Equation (1) helps to highlight the problem with using a single year’s 
RAMR as  a  prediction  of  the  true  hospital-level intercept.  Since the 
RAMR is estimated with error, we can improve the mean square error of 
the prediction by attenuating the coefficient toward zero, and this attenua- 
tion should be greater for hospitals in which the RAMR is not precisely 
estimated. Moreover, if  the true  hospital-specific intercepts from other 
outcomes’ equations (e.g., other years, other patients) are correlated with 
the intercept we  are trying to predict, then using their estimated values 
can further improve prediction ability. 
In  McClellan and Staiger (1997), we  developed a simple method for 
creating estimates of  pJ.,  based on equation (1). The key to the solution is 
noting that to estimate this hypothetical regression (e.g., get coefficients, 
predicted values, R2)  we only need three moment matrices: 
(0 
(ii)  E(WIJ.,)  =  E(tJ-L:P,), 
(iii)  E(F:P ,I. 
E(M:M!)  =  E(p:CL,) +  E(E:E,), 
We can estimate the required moment matrices directly as follows: 
1. We can estimate E(E~’E,)  with the patient-level ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimate of the variance-covariance for the parameter estimates Mz,. 
Call this estimate S,. 
2.  We can estimate E(p,,p) by noting that E(MrfMl  -  S,) = E(pg’p8).  If 
we  assume that E(p,’p,) is the same for all hospitals, then it can be esti- 
mated by the sample average of Mt‘M, -  S,. 
Finally, it helps to impose some structure on E(pz’pL,)  for two reasons. 
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the number of parameters that need to be estimated. Second, a time series 
structure allows for out-of-sample forecasts. Thus, we  assume a nonsta- 
tionary first-order vector autoregression (VAR) structure for pit (1  X  2). 
This VAR  structure implies that E(k,’p.,) =  f(r),  where I-  are the parame- 
ters  of  the  VAR.  These  parameters  can  be  estimated  by  generalized 
method of moments (GMM); that is, by  setting the theoretical moment 
matrix, f(r),  as close as possible to its sample analog, the sample average 
of Mz‘Ml -  S,. For details, see McClellan and Staiger (1997). 
With estimates of  E(p,’k,)  and E(E,’E,),  we  can form estimates of  the 
moments (i)-(iii)  needed to run  the hypothetical regression in  equation 
(1). By  analogy to simple regression, our predictions of a hospitals true 
intercept are given by: 
where we  use our estimates of E(pt!pi)  and E(E,!E,)  in place of their true 
values. We  refer to estimates based on equation (2) as “filtered RAMR” 
estimates, since these estimates are attempting to filter out the estimation 
error in the raw  data (and because our method is closely related to the 
idea of filtering in time series). 
3.4  National Estimates 
One common method of comparing quality of care across hospitals is 
to run cross-section regressions using a quality measure such as RAMR as 
the dependent variable and using hospital characteristics such as patient 
volume, ownership, and teaching status as independent variables. In this 
section, we investigate the extent to which using a filtered RAMR as the 
dependent variable affects the inferences that can be drawn from such 
regressions. A priori, we  would expect that using the filtered RAMR (as 
opposed to the actual RAMR in a given year) would improve the preci- 
sion of such regression estimates because the dependent variable is mea- 
sured with less noise. The gain in efficiency is likely to be particularly large 
for smaller hospitals, since the RAMR estimates in any single year for 
these hospitals have the lowest signal-to-noise ratio. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates this difference between filtered and actual RAMRs 
by  plotting each against volume using data from 1991. Throughout the 
remainder of the paper we focus on RAMRs based on 90-day mortality 
among Medicare AM1 admissions (although the filtered estimates incor- 
porate the information from 90-day mortality among IHD admissions as 
well). Keep in mind that the unit for the RAMR measures is the probabil- 
ity of death, so that a RAMR of 0.1 means that the hospital had a mortal- 
ity rate that was  10 percentage points higher than expected (e.g., 30 per- 
cent rather than 20 percent). 100  Mark McClellan and Douglas Staiger 
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There are two interesting features of figure 3.1. First, the filtered RAMR 
estimates have much less variance than the actual RAMR estimates, par- 
ticularly for smaller hospitals. This is  the result of  two distinct effects. 
Most  importantly, the filtered estimates for  small hospitals are relying 
more heavily on data from other years and other diagnoses, and this im- 
proves their precision. In addition, the filtered estimates assume the actual 
RAMR estimates for small hospitals have a very low signal-to-noise ratio, 
and therefore attenuate them back toward the average (similar to shrink- 
age estimators). 
A second interesting feature of figure 3.1 is that the relationship between 
outcomes and volume is much more apparent in the filtered data, High- 
volume hospitals clearly seem to have lower mortality. Thus, these filtered 
RAMRs appear  to be  a useful tool for uncovering quality differences 
across hospitals. 
Table 3.1 provides regression estimates that further suggest that these 
filtered RAMR estimates improve our ability to uncover differences in 
quality across hospitals. This table contains coefficient estimates from re- 
gressions of RAMR estimates (either actual or filtered) on dummies for 
ownership (for-profit and government, with not-for-profit the reference 
group), a dummy for being a teaching hospital, and the number of Medi- 
care AM1 admissions in the given  year  (in hundreds). Since volume is 
potentially endogenous (and since Medicare volume is a crude proxy for 
total volume), we  also report estimates from regressions that do not con- 
trol for volume. The table contains estimates for 1985, 1991, and 1994. The 
regressions using actual RAMRs are weighted by the number of Medicare 
admissions, while the regressions using filtered RAMRs are weighted by 
the inverse of the estimated variance of each hospital’s filtered RAMR es- 
timate. 
As one would expect, the regressions based on the filtered RAMR yield 
much more precise coefficient estimates. The standard errors in regres- Table 3.1  Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Hospital Characteristics and the Risk-Adjusted Mortality Rate (RAMR) Based on 90- 
Day Mortality for AM1 Admits (3,718 hospitals) 
1985  1991  1994 
Actual  Filtered Version  Actual  Filtered Version  Actual  Filtered Version 
RAMR  of RAMR  RAMR  of RAMR  RAMR  of  RAMR 
Number of Medicare  -0.0178 
admits in AM1  (0.0022) 
(1  00s) 
Government  0.0151 
(0.003  3) 
For-profit  0.0016 
(0.0043) 
(0.0033) 











0.0148  0.0219 
(0.0012)  (0.0033) 
0.0061  0.01 15 
(0.0016)  (0.0038) 
(0.0014)  (0.0030) 













0.0178  0.0169 
(0.0013)  (0.0033) 
0.0100  0.0102 
(0.0016)  (0.0038) 
-0.01  11  -0.0083 
(0.0014)  (0.0028) 
0.0109  0.0156 
(0.0012)  (0.0013) 
0.0087  0.0115 
(0.0015)  (0.0015) 
(0.0013)  (0.0013) 
-0.0047  -0.0102 
Note:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. Regressions using the actual RAMR weight by  the number of  AM1 admits. Regressions using the filtered 
RAMR weight by  I/u2,  where u  is the standard error of the estimated RAMR. 102  Mark McClellan and Douglas Staiger 
sions using the actual RAMRs are two to three times larger than the corre- 
sponding standard errors from regressions using the filtered RAMR. For 
example, using actual RAMR estimates in  1985, mortality in for-profit 
hospitals is estimated to be 0.16 percentage points higher than in not-for- 
profit hospitals. But the standard error for this estimate is so large (0.43 
percentage points) that the difference would have to be near a full percent- 
age point before we could be confident of a real difference in mortality. In 
contrast, using filtered RAMR estimates in 1985, mortality in for-profit 
hospitals is estimated to be 0.30 percentage points higher than in not-for- 
profit hospitals and this difference is borderline significant because of the 
much smaller standard error. 
More generally, the coefficients in the regressions using filtered RAMRs 
are precise enough to uncover a number of  interesting facts. For-profit 
hospitals have higher mortality than do not-for-profits (by 0.30 to 1.15 
percentage points depending on the year and specification). Government 
hospitals have higher mortality  and teaching hospitals lower mortality 
than do not-for-profit hospitals. These differences are larger in specifica- 
tions that  do not control for volume, because (1) government and for- 
profit hospitals tend to be smaller than average, while teaching hospitals 
tend to be larger than average, and (2) there is a strong negative relation- 
ship between volume and mortality. For example, in 1985 we  estimate that 
an additional 100 Medicare AM1 admissions was associated with 1.5 per- 
centage points lower mortality. 
The most striking finding in table 3.1 is the apparent change in the co- 
efficients between  1985 and 1994. In the specifications using the filtered 
RAMR, the coefficient estimates for for-profit and teaching hospitals rise 
by roughly half of a percentage point in absolute value between 1985 and 
1994. At the same time, the coefficient on volume fell in absolute value by 
about half a percentage point. 
These regression estimates suggest that the filtered RAMR can be a use- 
ful tool for uncovering general relationships between mortality and hospi- 
tal characteristics. Based on the filtered data, three facts are clear: (1) there 
is a negative relationship between volume and mortality, (2) for-profit hos- 
pitals and government hospitals have higher mortality than not-for-profit 
hospitals, while teaching hospitals have lower mortality, and (3) between 
1985 and 1994, mortality differences increased between for-profit and not- 
for-profit hospitals, and between teaching and nonteaching hospitals. 
These findings are generally consistent with the existing literature, al- 
though our estimates tend to be more precise. Studies examining a variety 
of patient populations and outcomes measures have found that higher vol- 
ume is associated with better patient  outcome^.^ Comparisons by  owner- 
ship and teaching status, to the extent they have found any differences, 
4. See Luft et al. (1990) for a fairly comprehensive study of the volume-outcome rela- 
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have found not-for-profit and teaching hospitals to have better patient 
~utcomes.~  The most novel of our findings is that these differences have 
widened over the last decade. This decade has been  a period  of  rapid 
change in  hospitals, spurred by  dramatic changes in the way  that both 
government and private insurers pay for hospital care. The extent to which 
these market changes might explain the growing differences in hospital 
mortality is an important area for future research. 
3.5  A Tale of Three Counties 
3.5.1  The Sample 
If the filtered RAMR helps to compare hospitals at the national level, 
can it also help at a more micro level? One important use for any measure 
of hospital quality is to compare individual hospitals within a given mar- 
ket. In this section, we  look more closely at the mortality performance of 
particular hospitals in three counties. Our goals are (1) to learn whether 
these quality measures are able to identify meaningful differences (and 
changes over time) in mortality among hospitals in a given city; and (2) to 
explore whether  these patterns  in mortality  could be  attributed  to for- 
profit ownership or other factors affecting the market. At the same time, 
by  going to the county level and focusing on a fixed group of hospitals, 
we  are able to address some of the general results discussed in section 3.4 
from a “case study” perspective. 
The three counties were chosen on the following basis. First, since we 
wanted to compare individual hospitals (but not too many hospitals) we 
limited our search to counties with 2-10  hospitals in our sample. In order 
to focus on for-profit hospitals, the county had to have at least one for- 
profit hospital and one other hospital with an average of at least 50 Medi- 
care AM1 admissions per year from 1984 to 1994. Within this subset we 
considered three categories of counties: 
Case 1: No change in for-profit ownership over the study period 
Case 2: At least one hospital converted into for-profit over the study pe- 
Case 3: At least one hospital  converted away  from for-profit over the 
Within each category we  eliminated counties that were obviously not dis- 
tinct markets (e.g., the suburbs of  Miami). Finally, we  chose the county 
that had the highest average volume in its primary hospitals. 
The resulting counties all contain relatively isolated midsized cities. To 
preserve the confidentiality of individual hospitals, we  refer to each hospi- 
tal according to its rank in terms of AM1 volume between 1984 and 1994. 
riod 
study period 
5. See the sources cited in nn. 1 and 2. 104  Mark McClellan and  Douglas Staiger 
Case 1 contains a small southern city with four larger-than-average hos- 
pitals. The largest (hospital 1) and smallest (hospital 4) are for-profit hos- 
pitals, both affiliated with the same for-profit chain. Hospital 2 is gov- 
ernment run, while hospital 3 is a not-for-profit. Relative to the other two 
cases, this city had experienced rapid growth in population and income 
during the 1980s and has a high number of hospital beds per capita. The 
population is somewhat older, less educated, and less likely to be white, 
with 10-20  percent enrolled in HMOs by  1994.'j 
Case 2 contains a midsized midwestern city with three larger-than- 
average hospitals and one very small hospital (hospital 4). Hospitals 1, 3, 
and 4 are not-for-profit. Hospital 2 was a not-for-profit  until the mid 1980s, 
at which time it was purchased by a large for-profit chain. The ownership of 
hospital 2 was transferred to a different for-profit chain in the early 1990s. 
Relative to the other two cases, this city had average growth in population 
and income during the 1980s and has a low number of hospital beds per 
capita. The population has higher income and is somewhat younger, more 
educated, and more likely to be white, with  10-20  percent enrolled in 
HMOs by  1994. 
Case 3 contains a midsized southern city with five larger-than-average 
hospitals. Hospitals 1, 2, and 4 are not-for-profit. Hospital 3 was initially 
government owned, and hospital 5 was initially for-profit. Both hospital 3 
and hospital 5 converted to not-for-profit status in the late 1980s. Relative 
to the other two cases, this city had low population growth during the 
1980s. Otherwise, this city has fairly average population characteristics 
with 10-20  percent enrolled in HMOs by  1994. 
3.5.2  Evidence on Quality in Each County 
In keeping with the exploratory nature of this analysis, figure 3.2 simply 
plots the RAMR (left panel) and filtered RAMR (right panel) annually 
from 1984 to 1994 for each hospital in case 1. Note that the vertical scale 
differs between the two plots (in order to preserve the detail of the filtered 
RAMR plot). Figure 3.3 plots this data slightly differently. Each panel 
corresponds to a hospital, and plots the actual RAMR along with the 
filtered RAMR and its 90 percent confidence band. Confidence bands for 
the actual RAMR are too large to fit on the figure. A horizontal line de- 
noting the RAMR at the average hospital in our sample is added to each 
panel for reference. The data for case 2 are similarly plotted below in fig- 
ures 3.4 and 3.5, and for case 3 in figures 3.6 and 3.1. 
For case 1, it is impossible to detect quality differences across the hospi- 
tals or over time based on the actual RAMR (see the left panel of fig. 3.2). 
6. Information on each city/county comes from the County and City Data Book for 1988 
and 1994. Information on HMO penetration in  each county was provided by  Laurence 
Baker, based on his calculations using HMO enrollment data from Interstudy. Comparing Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Hospitals  105 
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Fig. 3.3  Trends for case 1 in actual (thin line) and filtered (thick line with 90 
percent confidence Bands) RAMR by hospital 
Note: The straight horizontal line denotes the RAMR at the average hospital in our national 
sample (RAMR = 0 by definition). For description of the hospitals, see the note to fig. 3.2. 
Obviously, the problem is the variability in the actual RAMR: Even the 
largest hospital (1) experiences year-to-year changes in its actual RAMR 
of over five percentage points. 
In contrast, the filtered RAMR is much more stable and displays three 
interesting features. First, the for-profit hospitals (1 and 4) have, if  any- 
Fig. 3.2  Trends in risk-adjusted mortality rates (RAMRs) for case 1 (a mid-sized 
southern city) 
Note: Left panel based on actual RAMR and right panel based on filtered RAMR. (Note 
that the vertical scale of the two panels differs.) The hospitals are ranked from largest (1) to 
smallest (4) according to their number of Medicare AM1 admissions from 1984 to 1994. 
Hospitals 1 and 4 are for-profit hospitals and are affiliated with the same chain. Hospital 2 
is government owned, while hospital 3 is not-for-profit. 106  Mark McClellan and Douglas Staiger 
thing, lower mortality than the other hospitals in the market. The fact that 
the smallest hospital also has the lowest filtered RAMR seems surprising, 
but this may be the result of its affiliation with hospital 1 (recall that they 
are members of the same chain). A second interesting feature of the fil- 
tered data in figure 3.2 is that every hospital appears to experience an im- 
provement in mortality of about one to two percentage points in the mid- 
1980s relative to other  hospitals  nationally. Although  it is  beyond  the 
scope of this paper, an interesting topic for further research is the analysis 
of the cause of this general improvement in quality of care in this area.’ 
Finally, it is  notable that the range of filtered RAMR estimates, while 
much larger than the differences estimated between the average for-profit 
and not-for-profit in  table 3.1, are still relatively compressed. Based on 
national data, we  estimated (McClellan and Staiger 1997) that the stan- 
dard deviation across hospitals is around four percentage points for the 
true hospital-specific intercepts for 90-day mortality. 
Figure 3.3 plots each hospital’s data separately and adds 90  percent 
confidence bands to the filtered RAMR (thick line with vertical bars). The 
horizontal line at RAMR = 0 represents the national average in that year, 
so when the confidence bands lie entirely below  or above this line, it is 
likely that the hospital is, respectively, better or worse than average. Rela- 
tive to the size of  the confidence bands, there are not  large differences 
either across these hospitals or over time. Hospital  1 (the large for-profit) 
is the only hospital that is consistently better than the national average, 
and this seems to be consistent with its general status in the community. 
Thus, the overall picture for case 1 seems to be  one of fairly homoge- 
neous quality, perhaps slightly above the national average. There are hints 
of improvement over time and of better quality in the for-profit hospitals, 
but there are no dramatic differences. 
As figure 3.4 illustrates, case 2 is quite different. The only similarity is 
that it is impossible to detect quality differences across hospitals or over 
time based on the actual RAMR data plotted in the left panel of the figure. 
Using the filtered RAMR, there is a clear ranking of quality across hospi- 
tals that roughly corresponds to size. The largest hospital (a not-for-profit) 
consistently has the lowest mortality, while hospital 4 (a very  small hos- 
pital) has the highest mortality. The difference in mortality between the 
largest and smallest hospital is substantial, from six to over eight percent- 
age points. These differences are large even relative to the 90 percent con- 
fidence bounds for the filtered RAMR (see fig. 3.5). As in case 1, the hos- 
pital that we  identify as having the lowest mortality is recognized in the 
community as the leading hospital. 
Hospital 2 is of particular interest because it was taken over by  a for- 
7. Recall that the RAMR measures mortality relative to the average hospital, so this im- 
provement does not simply reflect the downward national trend in heart attack mortality 
rates. Mortality in these hospitals improved relative to the national average over this time. Comparing Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Hospitals  107 
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Fig. 3.4  Trends in risk-adjusted mortality rates (RAMRs) for case 2 (a mid-sized 
midwestern city) 
Note: Left panel based on actual RAMR and right panel based on filtered RAMR. (Note 
that the vertical scale of the two panels differs.) The hospitals are ranked from largest (1) to 
smallest (4) according to their number of  Medicare AM1 admissions from 1984 to 1994. 
Hospital 4 is quite small. Hospitals 1, 3, and 4 are not-for-profit hospitals. Hospital 2 was a 
not-for-profit that was purchased by  a for-profit chain in the mid-l980s, and then by  a differ- 
ent for-profit chain in the early 1990s. 
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Fig. 3.5  Trends for case 2 in actual (thin he)  and filtered (thick fine with 90 
percent conMence bands) RAMR by hospital 
Note: The straight horizontal line denotes the RAMR at the average hospital in our national 
sample (RAMR = 0 by  definition). For description of the hospitals, see the note to fig. 3.4. 
profit chain in the mid-1980s and then became part of a different for-profit 
chain in the early 1990s. Around both of these ownership changes, there is 
a notable decline in the hospital's filtered RAMR of about two percentage 
points. In fact, it is the only hospital in case 2 that has an apparent trend 
(downward) in its mortality, going from being worse than average to better 108  Mark McClellan and Douglas Staiger 
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Fig. 3.6  Trends in risk-adjusted mortality rates (RAMRs) for case 3 (a mid-sized 
southern city) 
Note; Left panel based on actual RAMR and right panel based on filtered RAMR. (Note 
that the vertical scale of the two panels differs.) The hospitals are ranked from largest (1) to 
smallest (5) according to their number of  Medicare AM1 admissions from  1984 to 1994. 
Hospitals 1,  2,  and 4 are not-for-profit hospitals. Hospital 3 was initially government owned 
and then converted to not-for-profit status in the late 1980s. Similarly, hospital  5 converted 
from for-profit to not-for-profit status in the late 1980s. 
than average. While it is not clear that the change in ownership per se led 
to these improvements, it is at least suggestive that this may be the case. 
The overall picture for case 2 seems to be one of more diversity of qual- 
ity, although fairly average quality overall. The purchase of a hospital first 
by  one and then another for-profit chain seemed, if anything, to improve 
quality. However, the purchased hospital is still not clearly any better than 
the national average in terms of mortality. 
Case 3 presents yet another situation (see figs. 3.6 and 3.7). Again, there 
is a wide range of quality across hospitals in this area, with the range in 
filtered RAMR of five to eight percentage points (see fig. 3.6). There is a 
clear downward trend in mortality occurring in this area, which is even 
seen in the actual RAMR (although the actual RAMR is still very noisy). 
Using the filtered RAMR, each of the hospitals in this area experienced 
a decline in mortality of between two and eight percentage points. Hos- 
pital 1, the largest not-for-profit, had the lowest mortality throughout al- 
most the entire period. Hospital 3, which converted from government to 
not-for-profit in the late 1980s, clearly had the highest mortality initially 
but also experienced one of the largest declines by 1994. Hospital 5, which 
converted from for-profit to not-for-profit in the late 1980s, had the largest 
mortality decline of all five hospitals to the point where it had the lowest 
filtered RAMR in the area in 1994. 
Thus, the overall picture for case 3 is one of rapidly improving quality 
in the area as a whole. At the same time, the for-profit and government 
hospitals converted to not-for-profit and had the most dramatic quality 
improvements in the area. 
There are two common themes across all of these cases. First, filtered Comparing Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-Profit  Hospitals  109 
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Fig. 3.7  Trends for case 3 in actual (thin line) and filtered (thick line with 90 
percent confidence bands) RAMR by hospital 
Note: The straight horizontal line denotes the RAMR at the average hospital in our national 
sample (RAMR = 0 by definition). For description of the hospitals, see the note to fig. 3.6. 
RAMRs appear to be a useful tool for analyzing quality of care differ- 
ences across hospitals and over time. More importantly, our microlevel 
evidence from these specific  cases is not consistent with the common belief 
(supported by  our aggregate regressions) that for-profit hospitals provide 
lower quality of care. In two of our three markets, for-profits appeared to 
be associated with higher quality of care: Hospitals that were for-profit 
throughout our study period tended to have lower mortality rates, and 
changes to for-profit status were associated with mortality reductions. 
What might explain this apparent conflict between the case-study evi- 
dence and the aggregate cross-section evidence, which showed a poorer 
performance overall for the for-profits? Some of the explanation may come 
from the way  in which we  chose our case studies, relying on areas with 
relatively large for-profit hospitals that were perhaps likely to represent 
“flagship” hospitals in their communities. These features may not be rep- 
resentative of the market status of a typical for-profit hospital. 
One possible explanation for these results could be that for-profit hos- 
pitals selectively locate in areas with low quality (see, e.g., Norton and 
Staiger 1994). Thus, the aggregate evidence would tend to find that for- 
profit ownership was correlated with lower quality, while within their mar- 
kets, the for-profit hospitals could provide higher quality (as in case l) or 
at least improve quality in the hospitals they acquire (as in case 2). This 
explanation would also imply that for-profit hospitals would tend to leave 
markets in which the quality was rising (as in case 3). If the cross-section 
correlation is being generated by location, then we  would expect within- 
county differences between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals to be 
smaller than across-county differences. In fact, when we  include county- 110  Mark McClellan and  Douglas Staiger 
level fixed-effects in the regressions from table 3.1, the estimated mortality 
difference between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals falls by roughly 
half. Thus, it appears that at least some of the difference in quality is 
generated by the different location patterns of for-profit hospitals. 
Why might for-profit hospitals tend to locate in areas with low hospital 
quality? One possible reason would be a relationship between poor hos- 
pital management and lower quality of care. Poorly managed hospitals 
might make attractive takeover targets for for-profit chains, but as a by- 
product, the for-profits would tend to enter markets with low quality of 
care. Alternatively, patients may demand high-quality care in some mar- 
kets, either because of demographic factors such as high income or be- 
cause of an existing high-quality hospital in the market (e.g., a teaching 
hospital). If providing such high-quality care results in lower patient mar- 
gins, then for-profits would be less likely to locate in these areas. 
These speculative explanations are based on the results of only a few 
market case studies. We  will  leave a more systematic exploration of this 
question to future work. Clearly, however, a final important conclusion of 
this research is that the “average” differences in mortality between for- 
profit and not-for-profit hospitals-or  among any other general system 
for classifying hospitals, such as bed size-account  for only a small share 
of the variation in outcomes across hospitals. Many not-for-profit hospi- 
tals are below average, many for-profit hospitals are above average, and 
these relationships vary enormously at the market level. More extensive 
market-level analyses using the methods we  have developed to evaluate 
quality could yield new insights into these complex relationships. 
3.6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have summarized new methods for evaluating  the qual- 
ity of care of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. These methods ad- 
dress two of  the major problems that have limited the value of previous 
hospital quality assessments: measurement of important outcomes, and 
the high level of noise in these measures. In McClellan and Staiger (1997), 
where we  describe these techniques in more detail, we  also present evi- 
dence on a third major problem: bias in the hospital comparisons because 
of unmeasured differences in case mix across hospitals. We use detailed 
medical chart review data to show that hospital performance measures for 
heart attack care that account for patient disease severity and comorbidity 
in a much more extensive way are highly correlated with the measures we 
report in this research. In other words, our measures with limited case- 
mix  adjustment provide reasonably good predictions of hospital perfor- 
mance in terms of measures based on detailed case-mix adjustment. Our 
results to date on the bias problem are by no means conclusive; hard-to- Comparing Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Hospitals  111 
measure patient factors may differ systematically  across hospitals, particu- 
larly for less acute conditions than heart attacks. At a minimum, however, 
by providing relatively precise measures of hospital performance for im- 
portant dimensions of hospital quality of care, our approach allows fur- 
ther research to focus on this final key problem. 
The results of our analysis provide a range of new insights for policy 
issues related to for-profit and not-for-profit hospital ownership. On aver- 
age, the performance of not-for-profit  hospitals in treating elderly patients 
with heart disease appears to be slightly better than that of for-profit hos- 
pitals, even after accounting for systematic differences in hospital size, 
teaching status, urbanization, and patient demographic characteristics. 
This average difference in mortality performance between for-profits and 
not-for-profits appears to be increasing over time. However, this small av- 
erage difference masks an enormous amount of variation in hospital qual- 
ity within the for-profit and not-for-profit hospital groups. Our case-study 
results also suggest that for-profits may  provide the impetus for quality 
improvements in markets where, for various reasons, relatively poor qual- 
ity of care is the norm. Understanding the many market- and hospital- 
specific factors that contribute to these variations in hospital quality is a 
crucial topic for further research. Using the methods and results devel- 
oped here, such detailed market analyses can be based on rather precise 
assessments of differences in hospital performance, rather than on specu- 
lation necessitated by imprecise or absent outcome measures. 
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